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Different Types of Experimentally Induced Sad Mood? 
Mood-induction procedures have been useful to investigate the role of dysfunctional 
cognitions in depression. In general, studies have shown that individuals with a his- 
tory of depression endorse more dysfunctional attitudes following the induction of 
sad mood than never-depressed individuals. However, a recent study failed to find 
the expected differences between previously depressed and never-depressed partici- 
pants. In the present study, two widely used mood-induction procedures were com- 
pared to investigate the possibility that different mood inductions lead to different 
outcomes. Forty-eight participants underwent two types of sad mood induction: fo- 
cusing on a sad memory while listening to music and watching a movie fragment. 
Consistent with modem cognitive theory, mood-state dependency of dysfunctional 
cognitions (cognitive reactivity) was much higher in vulnerable individuals. This 
effect occurred during both mood inductions. However, the effects of the music in- 
duction were somewhat larger, and the correlation between change of mood and 
cognitive reactivity was significant in this condition only. Some other subtle differ- 
ences between both procedures were found. In conclusion, although the effects of 
both inductions were largely similar, the musical induction is more sensitive, and is 
preferable for research into cognitive dysfunction in depression. 
According to cognitive theory, dysfunctional cognitions (schemas) repre- 
sent the core vulnerability to depression (Beck, 1967). The status of dysfunc- 
tional cognitions has been challenged, however, by a number of problematic 
findings. For instance, cognitions normalize when depression remits, also 
when cognitions were not targeted in therapy (Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 
1984). Since recovered depressed patients are quite vulnerable to relapses 
and recurrences (Judd, 1997; Mueller et a1 ., 1999), one would expect a core 
vulnerability marker to be measurable in many patients whose depression is 
in remission. However, not only are dysfunctional cognition scores equal in 
recovered depressed and never-depressed individuals (after controlling for 
residual low mood), they also do not predict depressive symptoms over time 
(Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981). These findings suggest that 
we may be dealing with epiphenomena rather than with vulnerability markers. 
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Recently, mood inductions have become popular methods of studying the 
role of dysfunctional cognitions in depression in more detail. The term mood 
induction refers to a variety of procedures that aim to induce a particular 
mood state in an individual, using psychological methods (see Martin, 1990, 
for an overview). After the induction of a sad mood, never-depressed individ- 
uals and recovered depressed patients typically experience similar changes in 
mood, but only the latter group also shows higher dysfunctional cognition 
scores (Miranda, Gross, Persons, & Hahn, 1998; Miranda & Persons, 1988). 
Similar findings have been obtained when cognitions were assessed during 
naturally occurring mood fluctuations (Miranda, Persons, & Byers, 1990). 
Also, individuals at risk for depression have shown negative information pro- 
cessing biases following a priming manipulation (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; 
Taylor & Ingram, 1999). These data suggest that formerly depressed patients 
may have a residual cognitive deficit that is only measurable during sad 
mood. This residual deficit has been labeled cognitive reactiviry. The impor- 
tance of this finding was shown by Segal, Gemar, and Williams (1999), who 
found that the mean cognitive reactivity score of 29 patients treated with anti- 
depressants was greater than that of 25 patients treated with cognitive ther- 
apy. Furthermore, cognitive reactivity predicted depressive relapses, regard- 
less of prior treatment modality. In conclusion, individuals whose cognitions 
change in reaction to mild dysphoria may be particularly prone to depressive 
relapse. If replicated, these findings may provide clinicians with a tool to 
assess the need for (continued) cognitive therapy in patients whose overt 
symptoms are in remission. 
However, one attempt to replicate the findings of Miranda et al. (1998) has 
failed. In a sample of formerly depressed and never-depressed college students, 
the association between sad mood and dysfunctional cognitions was investi- 
gated before and after the induction of sad mood (Brosse, Craighead, & Craig- 
head, 1999). Unexpectedly, the correlation between mood and cognition scores 
at baseline was equal in both groups. Furthermore, after the induction of sad 
mood, the magnitudes of cognitive change and the correlations between cog- 
nitive change and mood change were also equally strong in both groups. This 
study therefore failed to confirm the mood-state dependency of dysfunctional 
cognitions in vulnerable (recovered depressed) individuals. The authors dis- 
cuss several possibilities-most of these pertaining to sample differences-to 
explain the differences between their findings and Miranda et al. There was 
one procedural difference between both studies. Both used the same mood- 
induction procedure, but Miranda et al. conducted a diagnostic interview 
before the mood induction, whereas Brosse et al. did the reverse. Possibly, a 
diagnostic interview before mood induction acts as an additional cognitive 
prime (Brosse et al., 1999). This raises the possibility that the type of mood- 
induction procedure may be crucial to observed associations between 
changes in mood and cognition. The mood induction used by Brosse et al. 
and by Miranda et al. is a brief fragment of the movie The Champ, which 
shows the sadness and despair of a little boy who has just learned that his 
father died in a fight. Saddening as this fragment may be, it may not be an 
ideal probe in the context of depression research, because the scene does not 
necessarily have a personal significance .to the people who watch it. In con- 
trast, in the procedure used by Segal et al. (1999), participants, while listen- 
ing to sad music, are asked to focus on a time or event in their own lives when 
they felt sad. In other words, this procedure is more self-referent. The film 
procedure is not self-referent, although it is certainly possible that the film 
fragment triggers some personal memories. Whether or not this occurs is 
unpredictable; the extent to which it occurs has not been assessed in studies 
that used this method. 
The goal of the present study was to investigate whether these two types of 
mood inductions have different effects on mood, cognition, and the association 
between these two. The results of one of these mood inductions and its rela- 
tionship to a new questionnaire have been presented elsewhere (Van der Does, 
2002). The present report focuses on the comparison between the two methods. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through advertisements at the faculty of social 
sciences of Leiden University, The Netherlands. Inclusion criteria were age 
between 18 and 70 years and fluency in Dutch. Exclusion criterion was a cur- 
rent episode of depression according to DSM-N criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). 
Mood Inductions 
Music. This procedure was modeled after Segal et al. (1999). Participants 
were asked to listen to music, presented on audiotape, for 7 minutes, and to 
try to focus on a time or event in their lives when they felt sad. The music was 
the orchestral introduction by Prokofiev, entitled "Russia Under the Mongo- 
lian Yoke," from the film Alexander Nevsky. The taped segment played to par- 
ticipants was remastered at half speed. 
Film. Participants were shown a brief (2 minutes, 51 seconds) fragment 
from the movie The Champ, which has been shown to induce sadness reli- 
ably, and which was also used by Brosse et al. (1999). 
Instruments 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon & 
Williams, 1995). The current and past depression modules of the SCID were 
administered to check the exclusion criterion of current depression and to 
establish whether participants fulfilled DSM-IV depression criteria anytime in 
the past. 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmund & Snaith, 1983). 
The HADS is a self-report screening scale for anxiety and depression. In the 
present study, only the depression subscale (7 items) was used. Scores on the 
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HADS range from 0 to 21. An authorized Dutch translation of the HADS and 
large normative groups are available (Spinhoven, Ormel, Sloekers, Kempen, 
Speckens, & Van Hemert, 1997). 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale-Versions A and B (Weissman, 1979). The DAS 
measures dysfunctional beliefs that, according to cognitive theory, are core 
concepts of vulnerability to depression. Cognitive reactivity is the change of 
DAS scores before and after a mood induction procedure (Segal et al., 1999). 
Forms A and B of the DAS were used. Both forms have 40 items. 
Mood ratings. Participants gave three ratings of current mood (sad, irritated, 
tense) repeatedly throughout the experiment, using 0-to-10 Likert-type rating 
scales, with the following anchor points: not at all (0), somewhat ( 3 4 ,  
markedly (6-7), extremely (10). 
Reminiscence ofpersonal loss. The extent to which the film fragment 
reminded participants of a personal loss was measured by a single rating on a 
0-to- 10 Likert-type scale. 
Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity (LEIDS; Van der Does, 2002). The 
LEIDS aims to measure cognitive reactivity to sad mood independently from 
mood-induction procedures. Twenty-six items of this scale form four dimen- 
sions with good psychometric properties: Negative Self-Evaluation (NSE), 
Acceptance/Coping (AIC), Indifference (IND), Harm Avoidance (HA). The 
LEIDS appears to predict cognitive change following a mood induction pro- 
cedure (Van der Does). 
Design 
Participants underwent both mood-induction procedures, separated by a 
10-minute break and by a 7-minute neutral distraction task, to counter cross- 
over of residual mood and cognitive effects. Order of mood-induction manip- 
ulations was randomly varied across participants. Because it has been sug- 
gested that Forms A and B of the DAS are not equivalent (Power et al., 1994), 
both forms were maximally counterbalanced across participants and proce- 
dures, with the restriction that different DAS forms were administered before 
and after a particular mood induction. Form A of the DAS was administered 
before the first mood induction in half of the participants. Half of these par- 
ticipants also received Form A before the second mood induction; the other 
half received Form B first. Thus, there were four possible DAS orders: AB- 
AB; AB-BA; BA-BA; BA-AB. With two orders of mood inductions, there 
were eight orders overall, with six participants in each cell. 
Procedure 
Participants who signed up for the experiment received written information 
about the study by mail or e-mail. The study was presented as a study on the 
effects of sad mood on attention and memory. All participants were tested in 
a single session that lasted between 75 and 85 minutes. Participants were paid 
Dfl. 20 ($8). After opportunity for questions was given and informed consent 
was obtained, participants were interviewed with the SCID modules. Next, 
they filled out the HADS and LEIDS. A short (2 minutes) vocabulary test was 
administered as an IQ estimate. Since all participants were students, this IQ 
estimate did not provide much information, but was included to counteract 
possible mood-inducing effects of the SCID interview and questionnaires. 
Next, the first mood induction was administered, preceded by and followed 
by the DAS and the three mood ratings. This was followed by the neutral 
attention task, which lasted approximately 7 minutes, and a 10-minute coffee 
or tea break. Finally, the second mood induction was administered, again pre- 
ceded and followed by the DAS and mood ratings. Participants were then 
paid and debriefed. To lift any residual mood effects, participants were shown 
a brief humorous movie fragment. 
An experimenter was present in the test room, except during both mood- 
induction procedures when participants were left alone. As known to the par- 
ticipants, the experimenter went to an adjacent room and followed the proce- 
dure via one-way screen and intercom. In the music (self-referent) procedure, 
participants were signaled through the intercom after 7 minutes to begin fill- 
ing out the mood ratings and DAS. The music continued while the partici- 
pants filled out the questionnaires, and the experimenter returned when the 
questionnaires were completed. In the film procedure, the experimenter stopped 
the video with a remote control, which was the signal to begin filling out 
questionnaires. The experimenter returned when these were completed. Both 
mood-induction procedures were presented in the same way: Participants were 
told that they could probably easily prevent or counter any effects of the 
music or film, but they were asked to allow the effects to happen. 
Results 
Participants 
Forty-eight participants (33 women and 15 men) completed the experi- 
ment. There were no dropouts and no adverse events. All participants were 
college students. Their mean age was 21.1 years (SD = 1.9). None of the par- 
ticipants was currently depressed, but 8 (16.7%) had experienced a depres- 
sive episode in the past. Furthermore, 7 participants had experienced a minor 
or subthreshold depression: a period of sad mood or anhedonia that lasted at 
least 2 weeks, but with fewer than five DSM-N symptoms during that period. 
Current level of depressive symptoms was low and equivalent for previously 
and never-depressed participants: mean HADS scores = 1.5 (SD = 1.2) and 
1.6 (SD = 2.0), respectively. 
Effects of the Mood Inductions 
The effects of both mood manipulations are shown in Table 1. Both manip- 
ulations had a significant effect on sadness. Furthermore, the change score 
after the music induction was significantly bigger than after the film induc- 
tion. A 2 X 2 X 2 repeated-measures MANOVA with type of induction (film, 
music) and time (before, after induction) as within-subjects variables and 
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TABLE 1 
EFFECCS OF THE MOOD MANIPULATIONS ON MOOD AND COGNITIONS 
- -- - - - 
5 p e  of Sad Mood Induction Significance of Main and 
Music Film Interaction Effects 
Pre Post Pre Post PrePost MusicIFilm Interaction 
Sadness 0.8 3.6 1.0 2.8 p < 0.001 p = 0.045 p < 0.001 
(1.2) (1.7) (1.2) (1.5) 
Irritability 0.4 1.5 0.4 0.6 p < 0.001 p = 0.003 p = 0.002 
(0.8) (1.9) (0.7) (1.2) 
Tension 1.3 2.0 1.4 1.8 p = 0.007 p = 0.593 p = 0.169 
(1.5) (2.0) (1.7) (2.0) 
Dysfunctional 
Attitudes (DAS) 1 15.7 123.1 116.1 119.6 p = 0.039 p = 0.230 p = 0.1 11 
(1 9.7) (28.2) (20.6) (27.9) 
Note. Mean scores, standard deviations in parentheses. 
administration order as between-subjects factor, gave significant main effects 
for type, F(1,46) = 4.2,~ = 0.045, and time, F(l, 46) = 159.7, p < 0.001. 
The interaction was also significant, F(l, 46) = 14.7, p < 0.001, indicating 
that the magnitude of the effect differed between manipulations. The main 
effect of administration order and all interactions involving order were not 
significant. Both inductions, particularly the music manipulation, also had 
effects on initation and tension, but these effects were much smaller than the 
effect on sadness. 
Using DAS scores as the dependent variables, the 2 X 2 X 2 repeated- 
measures MANOVA yielded a main effect of time, F(1,46) = 4.5,~ = 0.04, 
indicating that the manipulations also had an effect on dysfunctional atti- 
tudes. The change was somewhat bigger in the self-referent condition (5.4 
versus 3.3, but this difference was not statistically significant: Time X Type 
interaction, F(1,46) = 2.6; p = 0.1 1. Again, all effects involving administra- 
tion order were nonsignificant. 
During the film induction, some participants were reminded of a personal 
loss. The mean score of this variable was M = 1.5 (SD = 2.2; range: 0 to 10). 
Twenty-two participants scored zero on this measure, 15 participants scored 
1 or 2, and 1 1  participants scored higher than 2. The extent to which the frag- 
ment reminded participants of a personal loss correlated significantly with 
cognitive change (Spearman's rho = 0.35; p = 0.014). There was some evi- 
dence of an order effect here: The correlation was significant only in the par- 
ticipants who received the film as the second mood induction: rho = 0.41 
( p  < 0.05). In these participants, the correlation with change of sadness was 
also significant: rho = 0.44 (p < 0.05). When the film was presented first, 
both correlations were low and nonsignificant. There was no evidence for a 
mood-induction order effect on reminiscence score per se, only on its correla- 
tions with mood and cognitive change scores. In other words, the effects of 
the musical induction may have selectively camed over to the film induction: 
If the film reminded participants of a personal loss, the result was a larger 
change of sadness and dysfunctional cognitions, but only if participants had 
already undergone the musical induction. Further inspection indicated that 
this effect may have occurred primarily in the formerly depressed group, but 
the numbers were too small to conduct meaningful statistical analyses. 
During the musical induction, reminiscence of personal loss (of the film) 
did not correlate with mood or cognitive effects, suggesting no carryover 
effect from the film to the musical condition. 
The correlation between change in sadness and change in DAS score was 
significant in the music condition: r .= 0.30 ( p  = 0.038). In the film condi- 
tion, this correlation was nonsignificant at r = 0.13. There was no evidence 
for nonlinear relationships (threshold effect) for either mood induction. Fur- 
thermore, reminiscence of personal loss did not affect the strength of the cor- 
relation in the film induction, as it was low and nonsignificant in participants 
with low, intermediate, and high scores for reminiscence. 
Effects of the Mood Inductions and Past History of Depression 
Contrary to their predictions based on Miranda and Persons's (1988) mood- 
state theory, Brosse et al. (1999) found equivalent changes in mood and dys- 
functional attitudes for previously depressed and never-depressed individu- 
als. To investigate this in the present sample, the MANOVAs were repeated, 
with past history of depression added as a between-subjects factor. To control 
for a possible confounder, gender was also added as between-subjects factor. 
With sad mood as the dependent variable, all main and interaction effects 
involving gender and past depression were nonsignificant, indicating that the 
mood effects were equally strong for men and women, and equally strong for 
previously depressed and never-depressed individuals. 
However, with dysfunctional attitudes as the dependent variable, a signifi- 
cant interaction appeared of time and past history of depression: F(44, 1) = 
5.5; p = 0.02. The interaction is depicted in Table 2, top half. Across both 
mood inductions, the change of DAS scores was much bigger for previously 
depressed than for never-depressed participants. An interesting difference 
appeared when the seven participants who had a subthreshold depressive epi- 
sode in the past (i.e., fewer than five symptoms) were examined separately. 
The bottom half of Table 2 shows that these individuals' cognitive reactivity 
appeared to be stronger in the self-referent than in the non-self-referent mood 
induction. Although the ANOVAs comparing never-, partially, and previously 
depressed participants were statistically significant for neither mood induc- 
tion, a paired-samples t test indicated a significant pre-post difference for 
cognitive scores in the musical condition, t(6) = -2.3,p(one-tailed) = 0.03, 
but not in the film condition. 
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TABLE 2 
MOOD CHANGE AND COGNITIVE CHANGE AND PAST HISTORY OF DEPRESSION 
Music Film 
Past depression Mean (SD) Contrast Mean (SD) Contrast 
Mood change No (N = 40) 2.8 (1.8) t(46) = -0.1 ; 
Yes(N=8) 2.9(1.6) ns 
Cognitive No (N = 40) 5.2 (1 5.8) t(46) = - 1.8; 
change Yes (N = 8) 18.7 (3 1.8) p = 0.04 
Mood change No (N = 33) 2.8 (2.0) 
Partial (N = 7) 3.0 (1 .O) F(2.45) = 0.04; 
Yes (N = 8) 2.9 (1.6) p = 0.96 
Cognitive No (N = 33) 3.9 (16.2) 
change Partial (N = 7) 11 .I (12.7) F(2.45) = 2.09; 
Yes(N=8) 18.7(31.8) p=O.14 
Note. Contrast refers to t test for independent samples (one-tailed significance) and one-way 
analysis of variance. 
Finally, current level of depressive symptoms did not correlate with the 
effects of either mood induction, after the exclusion of one statistical outlier. 
Cognitive change scores were predicted by LEIDS scores about equally 
well in both procedures, but partly by different subscales (see Table 3). In 
both mood inductions, negative self-evaluation and harm avoidance entered 
the stepwise regression equation. In the music induction, acceptancelcoping 
also entered (with a negative @), whereas indifference entered in the film con- 
dition (also with a negative @). 
Discussion 
The present study revealed important similarities between two types of sad 
mood induction. Both procedures had similar mood effects for never-depressed 
and previously depressed individuals, and both had much higher cognitive 
effects in the latter group. In other words, the main prediction of modem 
cognitive theory of depression-mood-state dependency of dysfunctional cog- 
nitions in vulnerable individuals only-was supported by the results of both 
procedures. 
There were also some interesting differences. First, the music condition 
had somewhat bigger effects than the film procedure on all outcome mea- 
sures (moods, cognitions); the differences were statistically significant for 
sadness and irritability. Second, the effects of the music condition were more 
strongly in accordance with cognitive theory. Although recovered depressed 
participants had higher cognitive reactivity scores in both conditions, the cor- 
relation between change in mood and cognitive change was significant in the 
TABLE 3 
PREDICTION F COGNITIVE R ACTIVITY 
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis 
Step, Variables R R2 FChange p Beta t P 
Music conditiona 
1. NSE 
2. AMood 
3. AIC 
4. HA 
Film conditionb 
1. NSE 
2. IND 
3. DAS Pre 
4. HA 
Note. LEIDS = Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity; NSE = Negative Self-Evaluation; A/C = 
Acceptance/Coping; IND = Indifference; HA = Harm Avoidance; DAS = Dysfunc- 
tional Attitude Scale; DAS Pre = DAS baseline score; A Mood = Change of sadness 
before and after mood induction; Mood ind = Mood induction; HADS = Hospital Anx- 
iety and Depression Scale. 
a Not in the equation: DAS Pre; IND; History of Depression; HADS Depression; Anxi- 
ety Sensitivity. 
Not in the equation: A Mood; MFN; Anxiety Sensitivity; History of Depression; HADS 
Depression. 
music condition only. Furthermore, participants who had experienced a sub- 
threshold depressive episode in the past appeared to react more strongly to 
the music induction. In other words, the music induction seems to be the 
more sensitive measure of cognitive reactivity. LEIDS scores also had some- 
what different'relationships with the two mood inductions: Indifference had a 
protective effect in the film condition, whereas acceptancelcoping had a pro- 
tective effect in the music condition. 
One motive for the present study was the inconsistency between the find- 
ings by Brosse et al. (1999) and previous studies using mood inductions in 
formerly and never-depressed individuals. Although the present study indi- 
cates that the music induction is a more sensitive procedure, the Brosse et al. 
findings remain anomalous. In the present study, cognitive reactivity during 
the film procedure was also substantially bigger for previously depressed par- 
ticipants. Brosse et al. suggested a procedural explanation of their findings: 
Administering a diagnostic interview before the film induction may have 
acted as an additional cognitive prime, resulting in a stronger effect in the 
never-depressed group. The present study suggests that this may indeed be 
the case: There was evidence for a carryover effect from the musical to the 
film induction, despite the fact that both procedures were separated by a neutral 
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distraction task and a short break. In contrast, no evidence was found for carry- 
over effects from the film to the music induction. 
An important limitation of the present study is the small number of partici- 
pants with a history of depression. Furthermore, it should be noted that there 
are many differences in content and procedure between the two mood induc- 
tions that were used in this study. For instance, the music induction lasts 7 
minutes, whereas the duration of the film fragment is less than 3 minutes. The 
present study does not indicate which characteristic of the mood induction 
procedure (self-reference nature, duration, other?) is responsible for the dif- 
ferences, nor was it designed to do so. The purpose of the study was to com- 
pare two widely used mood induction procedures that had led to inconsistent 
findings in previous studies. 
In conclusion, the music and film mood-induction procedures have largely 
similar effects, but there are also subtle differences. The music induction is 
the more sensitive procedure to study the role of cognitive dysfunction in 
depression. 
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